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The Fight for Birth Control: Down with Trump’s Contraceptive Mandate 
Kamera Boyd 
 
 
 
I. Background: The Contraception Mandate 
1. What’s So Great About Birth Control Anyway? 
 Whether it is your mother, sister, aunt, grandmother, or even yourself, women need special health 
care coverage to regulate their reproductive health. From the young women hoping to finish college to the 
families struggling to make ends meet1, birth control has helped a range of women of all ages, races, and 
socioeconomic statuses organize their lives.2  Health insurance plans that cover contraceptives have 
alleviated the burden for women who worry about paying to maintain their reproductive health.  
Mandated birth control shows that the government has taken the initiative in responding to women’s 
health concerns with the appropriate care.  The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) is one of the greatest 
advancements for women’s health.3  The improvement of health quality reflects women’s experiences as 
patients, mothers, and caregivers.4  For some women, contraceptive coverage offers a sense of control 
over their reproductive rights while for others, it provides security that institutions are working toward 
acknowledging their health, body, and mind.5  On average, women spend far more time involved in the 
health care system than men.6  Women’s involvement in the health care system increase during their 
reproductive years.7   
 
1 Planned Parenthood Action Fund, Birth Control Stories, (2019) plannedparenthoodaction.org/issues/birth-control-
stories. 
2 Id. 
3 National Partnership for Women, Families, Why the ACA Matters for Women: Summary of Key Provisions, (July, 
2012) www.nationalpartnership.org/ACA.http://go.nationalpartnership.org/site/; 
4 Id. 
5 Id.  
6 Id. (Beginning in 2014, the ACA will prohibit new plans in the individual and small group market from charging 
women higher premiums simply because of their gender. [F]or the first time in history, gender discrimination will be 
prohibited in all federally funded health care).  
7 Id. 
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 Women’s right to “Full and Equal” health care is under attack by the Trump Administration’s 
recent promulgation of the “Moral IFC.”8  These regulations allow employers to adopt health care plans 
that deny contraceptive coverage to female employees if the employer expresses a moral or religious 
objection.9  The exemption applies to any employer or college/university with student health plans, that 
has religious objections to contraception coverage, and to any non-profit employer, except publicly traded 
corporations with moral objections to contraception.10  This comment intends to examine how the passage 
of the mandate titled the “Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive 
Services under the Affordable Care Act,”11 also known as the “Moral IFC”, is procedurally and 
substantively impermissible, and encroaches on important constitutional values.  First, the comment 
examines the failure of the Department of Health and Human Services to follow the notice-and-comment 
provision under the Administrative Procedure Act. Second, the comment analyzes the inconsistencies 
between the recent adoption of the Moral IFC and the Affordable Care Act (ACA).  Then, this comment 
takes a look at broader issues regarding the Moral IFC—specifically (1) the implications of the countless 
instances in which the Trump Administration failed to follow administrative procedures and how that 
alarming trend effects the constitutional principle of separation of powers; and (2) how the Moral IFC 
undermines the important constitutional rights regarding privacy and bodily autonomy.  
2. ACA’s Contribution to Women’s Health 
 
8 I refer to the Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services under the 
Affordable Care Act (document citation 83 FR 57592) as the “the Moral IFC” because that is the short name used by 
“Agencies”. When I use the term “Agencies” I am referring to the Department of Treasury, Employee Benefits 
Security Administration, Department of Labor, and Department of Health and Human Services; the “IFC” stands for 
Interim Final Regulations with request for comments. Federal Register The Daily Journal of the United States, 
National Archives 11/15/2018 https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/11/15/2018-24514/moral-
exemptions-and-accommodations-for-coverage-of-certain-preventive-services-under-the-affordable 
9 Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services, 83 Fed. Reg. 57592 (Nov. 
15, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 54) 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 57596 In respect to the Moral IFC passed by The Trump Administration, the executive departments 
responsible for promulgating the rules include the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), the 
Department of Labor, and the Department of Treasury (offered referred as “The Departments” or “Agencies” under 
83 FR. 57592.) 
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 The ACA created affordable health plans that included reproductive coverage so women could 
satisfy their health care demands.12  Originally, the Affordable Care Act excluded preventive services that 
many women advocates and medical professionals believed were critical for women’s health.13  To 
address women’s health concerns, Senator Barbara Mikulski introduced the Women’s Health Amendment 
(“WHA”), which added a new category to the ACA dedicated to preventive services catered to women’s 
health.14  Senator Mikulski stated, “copayments are so high that women avoided getting preventive and 
screening services in the first place.”15  According to sponsors of the bill, an increase in contraceptive 
coverage would produce important public health gains.16  Under the passage of the WHA, the ACA 
required new insurance plans to include coverage without cost sharing of “additional preventive care and 
screening.”17  These services were provided for in the comprehensive guidelines outlined by the Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA).18  
 The WHA ensured that women had access to certain health-care services and this health coverage 
amendment allowed 62 million women to gain health care coverage.19  In 2010, The Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 confirmed the contraceptive mandate for women’s preventive services 
without cost-sharing.20  In other words, health insurance plans had to cover ACA-approved contraceptive 
methods and counseling provided by an in-network provider, without charging a co-payment or 
coinsurance, even if the deductible had not been met.21  This extensive coverage has been revolutionary 
for women of all generations because the mandate implemented by the ACA has greatly improved 
 
12 Kristyn Densmore, The Struggle of a Woman’s Body in a Man’s World, 18 APPALJL. 25, 26 (2018) 
13 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., J. Ginsburg dissenting 573 U.S. 682, 742 (2014). 
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Planned Parenthood Action Fund, The Fight for Birth Control, (2020) 
https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/fight-for-birth-controlThe Fight for Birth Control, Planned Parenthood  
20 42 USCA § 300gg-13; ehealthinsurance, History and Timeline of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) (Mar. 5, 2018) 
ehealthinsurance.com/resources/affordable-care-act/history-timeline-affordable-care-act-aca.  
21 Sara Rosenbaum, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Implications for Public Health Policy and 
Practice, (2011) https://www/ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3001814/.  
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women’s access to preventive care coverage.22  Without insurance, birth control pills would typically cost 
between $15 to $50 per month which adds up to $600 per year, intrauterine devices cost $1,300, birth 
control implants costs $1,300, vaginal rings cost $200 per month, and birth control shots cost $150 every 
three months.23  The goal for the Contraceptive Mandate under the ACA was that women would not have 
to pay more than men for health insurance policies, women would not be denied coverage due to sickness 
or pre-existing conditions, and that more low-income women would have timely access to family 
planning services.24  This note makes clear that the Trump Administration did not start the regression of 
the birth control mandate; rather, controversial religious debates surrounding the issue may have 
influenced the Trump Administration to significantly alter the Contraceptive Mandate under the ACA.   
3. The ACA Has Not Been Accepted by Everyone 
 The ACA is known for being a controversial legislation, so it is no surprise that the Contraceptive 
Mandate within the ACA provoked intense and fervent debate.  Many committed supporters and 
opponents alike have used the media to express their views on the legislation.25  The controversy 
prompted modifications (through regulation and litigation) to the Contraceptive Mandate to provide 
various exemptions and accommodations for employers with religious and moral objections to 
contraceptive services in health plans.26  For example, in 2012, the Departments of Labor, Human 
 
22 National Partnership for Women, supra note 3(July, 2012) (The National Partnership summarizes key provisions 
of the ACA and their relationship to women’s health, they include a list of statistics that show how the 
Contraceptive Coverage under the ACA has benefitted women since its enactment in 2012: By 2014, major changes 
to the health care system could make nearly 19 million previously uninsured women eligible for affordable, 
comprehensive health coverage; 2.5 million more young adults are insured because the ACA allows them the right 
to stay on family’s health insurance until the age of 26; Women will be guaranteed preventive services such as birth 
control, mammograms, cervical cancer screening, with no deductibles or copays; Family planning providers will 
continue to provide health services to women they serve; Pregnant and parenting women on Medicaid will get 
access to needed services such as professional parenting information on post-partum depression and anti-smoking 
programs).  
23 The Fight for Birth Control, Planned Parenthood Action Fund (2020) 
https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/fight-for-birth-control; Birth control, Planned Parenthood.org (2020)  
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/birth-control 
24 Id.  
25 Ctr. for Reproductive Rights, The Contraceptive Controversy: A Comprehensive Reply, 
https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/crr_the_contraception_controversy.pdf 
26 Patricia A. Moran The Affordable Care Act’s Contraceptive Mandate A Loss in Massachusetts and Other Current 
Events, March 20, 2018. Mintz.com.  
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Services, and the Treasury provided a full exemption for a group of religious employers; mainly churches 
and establishments deemed houses of worship.27  Between 2013 and 2014, the Departments adopted an 
accommodation for non-profit, religious organizations that opposed covering contraceptives for 
employees under their health plans for some or all contraceptive services.28  Under the accommodation, 
an objecting employer had to self-certify and notify the department of Health and Human Services, the 
plan’s insurer, or the plan’s third party administration of its objection, and these parties would separately 
provide the coverage to the employee.29 The accommodation allows the employee to still get insurance 
through the employer’s insurance plan, even though the employer removes them from providing 
contraceptive coverage. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,  the Supreme Court agreed with Hobby Lobby that 
the accommodation was too narrow and should be extended to additional employers.30  Thus, pursuant to 
Hobby Lobby, the accommodation was extended to closely-held, private, for-profit employers, whose 
owners objected to the contraceptive mandate based on religious beliefs.31  In 2012, the accommodating 
health plans had the approval of the majority of Americans and has even gained the support of many large 
Catholic Organizations such as the Catholic Health Association, the Association of Jesuit Colleges and 
Universities, and the Sisters of Mercy of the Americas, and other Catholic charities.32   These 
organizations appreciated the benefits of the Contraceptive Mandate, including far reaching coverage for 
women in economically and socially disadvantaged backgrounds.33  On the other side of the debate,  
opponents of the Birth Control Mandate under the ACA grounded their opposition in claims of religious 
freedom.34  For example, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) and some other 
religious leaders have vehemently objected to the policy, claiming it would violate religious liberty 
 
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
31 Moran, supra note 26. 
32 Ctr. for Reproductive Rights, supra note 25 at 2.  
33 Ctr. for Reproductive Rights, supra note 25 at 2. 
34 Ctr. for Reproductive Rights, supra note 25 at 3.  
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despite not being charged for the contraceptive coverage, or required to communicate about it.35  Instead, 
they urge support for radical and highly unpopular legislation to allow any employer, including anyone 
who “runs a Taco Bell” to refuse to provide coverage for any services on any moral or religious ground.36  
Arguably, it appears that the points made by religious dissenters mirror the same rationale outlined by the 
Trump Administration in the Moral IFC.  Thus, there is strong evidence that legal consensus sometimes 
yields to the face of passionate dissenters.  In this case, the Trump Administration shaped its’ policy 
initiatives to undermine a major provision in the ACA.   
4. Contraception Coverage with a New Face—Promulgated by the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS)  
 With the recent passage of the Moral IFC, the Trump Administration threatens to corrode 
women’s advanced health care envisioned by the Affordable Care Act. The Moral IFC is comprised of 
two regulations: (1) a rule that “allows nonprofit and for-profit employers with an objection to 
contraceptive coverage based on religious beliefs to qualify for an exemption and drop contraceptive 
coverage from their plans,” and (2) a rule that “exempts all but publicly traded employers with moral 
objections to also qualify under the exemption to contraception.”37  These regulations also apply to 
“private institutions of higher education that issue student health plans.”38  The rules were promulgated by 
the HHS and the Department of Labor and Treasury (“the Agencies”) to finalize the interim rules issued 
in the Federal Register on October 13, 2017.39  The purpose of the rules are to “expand exemptions to 
protect religious beliefs for certain entities and individuals whose health plans are subject to a mandate of 
contraceptive coverage through guidelines issued pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
 
35 Ctr. for Reproductive Rights, supra note 25 at 3.  
36 Ctr. for Reproductive Rights, supra note 25 at 3.  
 
3783 Fed. Reg. 57592, supra note 9 at 57537; Laurie Sobel, Alina Salganicoff, Caroline Rosenzweig New 
Regulations Broadening Employer Exemptions to Contraceptive Coverage: Impact on Women, (Nov. 19, 2018) 
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/new-regulations-broadening-employer-exemptions-to-contraceptive-
coverage-impact-on-women/ 
38Id. 
39Id. at 57536. 
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Act.”40  The time to challenge these regulations is now because the rules have been in effect since January 
14, 2019.41  
 There are serious procedural, substantive, and constitutional problems with the Trump 
Administration’s decision to scale back employers’ obligations to provide women with contraception in 
their health plans. First, this comment will trace the procedural errors made by the Trump Administration, 
demonstrating that the promulgation of both regulations ultimately violated the Administrative Procedure 
Act. The comment hopes to make clear that a blatant disregard for procedural rules by any administration 
is unacceptable. Second, this comment will summarize the Third Circuit’s conclusions that the Moral IFC 
is incompatible with the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) and not authorized under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”). The final part of this comment explores the constitutional implications of the 
Moral IFC in two sections: (1) the comment situates the regulations within the Trump Administration’s 
broader pattern of cases showing non-compliance with administrative procedures. The implications of this 
extensive record show that the Moral IFC is part of a disreputable trend of defiance and disregard for 
administrative procedures and fairness by the Trump Administration, which ultimately threatens the 
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers; (2) the comment will analyze how the unilateral executive 
action by the Trump Administration encroaches on women’s health rights. The Supreme Court’s 
recognition of a constitutional right to privacy, though not directly applicable to the Moral IFC, remains 
significant for two reasons. The Moral IFC encroaches on values whose importance has been repeatedly 
emphasized by the court; and the regulations threaten to erode women’s reliance on health insured birth 
control solidified by the Women’s Health Amendment and the Affordable Care Act.  
II. Procedural Invalidity of the Moral IFC (i.e., why/how the Trump Administration violated the 
APA) 
 To analyze whether the Moral IFC complies with the procedures under the Administrative 
Procedure Act and is compatible with the ACA and the RFRA, this comment analyzes arguments made 
 
40Id.  
41 Id.  
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by both parties in recent civil suit Pennsylvania v. President U.S. This comment also examines the 
reasoning set forth by the Third Circuit when deciding the case.   
A. What is the Administrative Procedure Act?  
 The Administrative Procedure Act sets out procedures that Agencies must follow when 
promulgating rules and issuing orders.42  In particular, this note focuses on the notice-and-comment 
provision of Section 553 which governs the informal rulemaking process. The notice-and-comment 
provision consists of a three-step rule for Agencies to follow when issuing a new interpretation of a rule.43 
First, the agency must give notice of proposed rulemaking and describe the proposed rule in detail.44  
Second, “the agency must solicit, receive, and consider comments on the proposed rule from interested 
members of the public.”45  Third, after considering public comments, the agency has to publish the final 
rules along with a concise general statement of purpose. 46  Rules issued through the notice-and-comment 
process are often referred to as “legislative rules” because they have the “force and effect of law.”47  
Congress intended for the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures to serve several objective such as: 
exposure to diverse public comments to ensure that agency regulations are experimented, provide fairness 
to interested parties, and give affected parties an opportunity to develop a record for Judicial Review.48   
 Congress prescribed the Administrative Procedure Act as a way to improve the rulemaking 
process by creating administrative procedures for Executive agencies to follow.49  Therefore, the APA is a 
 
42 David B. Chaffin, Remedies for Non-Compliance with Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act: A 
Critical Evaluation of United States Steel and Western Oil & Gas, 1982 Duke LJ. 461, 461 (1982)  
43 Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S.Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015); 5 U.S.C. § 553  
44 Richard J. Pierce Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMLR 547, 549-50 (2000); 
§553(b).  
45 Id. 
46 Id.   
47 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-303 (1979). 
48Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of 
Am. V. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).  
49 Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Administrative Procedure Act: Report on the Committee of the Judiciary, S. Rep. 
no. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1945), reprinted in Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, S. 
Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1, 187 (1946); David B. Chaffin, Remedies for Non-Compliance with Section 
553 of the Administrative Procedure Act: A Critical Evaluation of United States Steel and Western Oil & Gas, 1982 
Duke LJ. 461, 472 (1982).  
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way for Congress to limit the Executive “rulemaking” powers.50  Congress adopted Section 553 of the Act 
to set minimum procedures that agencies are, in most instances, obligated to follow when promulgating 
rules.51  According to the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on APA, “Section 553 was designed to help 
agencies promulgate more rational, accurate rules by exposing the rulemaking process to criticism from 
interested parties, commentators, and the public.”52  Another value underlying Section 553 is to help 
ensure that agencies act in a way that encourages public participation and deliberation.53  It is a procedural 
device that requires agencies to collect and grapple with a lot of information before acting, thus fully 
embracing the quality of rulemaking while also acting on a sort of check on the executive branch.54 
 The APA makes notice-and-comment required in informal rulemaking unless otherwise specified 
by statute or agency action falls within one of the exceptions.55  The notice-and comment provision does 
not apply to all rules issued by agencies.56  Hence, under 553, two narrow exceptions allow agencies to 
bypass the notice-and-comment requirements.57  Under the first exception, the APA provides that “unless 
another statute states otherwise by notice or hearing, the notice-and-comment requirement does not apply 
to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization of procedure or 
practice.”58  The second exception states that agencies are precluded from following the notice-and-
comment provision when the agency shows a “good cause”— that is, a reason why following notice and 
comment procedures would prove impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to public interest.59  
 The APA’s rulemaking requirements thus act as a procedural safeguard to ensure that federal 
governmental agencies are held accountable and make well-reasoned decisions.60  Under the first 
exception, notice and comment are not required if an agency is merely interpreting a rule.  According to 
 
50Id.  
51 5 U.S.C § 553 (b)(1976). 
52 Chaffin, supra note 42 at 472.  
53 Chaffin, supra note 42 at 464. 
54 Chaffin, supra note 42 at 464. 
55 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). 
59 §553(b)(B). 
60 Erringer v. Thompson, 371 F.3d 625, 629 (9th Cir. 2004).   
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Perez, the APA distinguishes between two types of rules: (1) ‘legislative rules’ which are issued through 
notice-and-comment rule making and (2) “interpretative rules”, which are issued merely to advise the 
agency’s construction of the statutes and rules and, by contrast, does not require notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.61  Rules issued by agencies qualify as legislative rules if they have “force and effect of 
law.”62  In other words, an agency must use the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures when it issues a 
novel interpretation of a regulation that deviates significantly from one the agency adopted in the past.63 
The dominant test for differentiating between legislative rules and interpretative rules is the Legal Effects 
Test, articulated in American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Administration.64  Under the test, 
the legal effect is discovered by asking four questions: (1) whether in the absence of the rule there would 
not be an adequate legislative basis for enforcement action or other action to confer benefits or ensure the 
performance of duties, (2) whether the agency has published the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations, 
(3) whether the agency has explicitly invoked its general legislative authority, or (4) whether the rule 
effectively amends a prior legislative rule. If the answer to any of these questions is yes, the rule is a 
legislative rule.65   
 Under this Legal Effects Test, the Moral IFC is a legislative rule and therefore HHS was bound to 
follow notice-and-comment procedures set forth in the APA. Just one of the four questions need to be 
answered in the affirmative for the Moral IFC to be a legislative rule. When applying the Legal Effects 
test, the Moral IFC is a legislative rule because the HHS has published the regulations in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.66  The Moral IFC is more akin to a legislative rule than an interpretative rule for a 
few other reasons.  One, the Moral IFC issued by the HHS constitutes a “final agency action” for APA 
 
61 Perez, supra note 43 at 1200-01 (citing Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 514 U.S. 84, 99 (1995)). See also §§ 
553(b),(c).  
62 Perez, supra note 43 at 1203 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-303 (1979).  
63 Chaffin, supra note 42 at 472. 
64 American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Administration, 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  See 
also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Texas Children’s Hosp. v. 
Azar, 315 F.Supp.3d 322, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2018).  
65 Id.  
66 See 83 Fed. Reg. supra note 9 at 57592. 
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purposes because it marks the completion of the Agency’s decision-making process.67  Two, the Moral 
IFC constitutes an action from which “legal consequences will flow” because the Moral IFC alters the 
regulatory scheme, instituted by the Health Resources and Services Administration68 (HRSA). 69   Three, 
the expansion of employers that can now eliminate contraceptive coverage of birth control will have an 
adverse impact on women across the country. Thus, the rules proscribed by HHS “must be subjected to a 
notice and comment period before taking effect.”70   
B. Procedures Utilized by the HHS 
 In May 2017, President Donald Trump issued an executive order mandating the HHS and the 
Departments of Labor and Treasury to “consider issuing revised regulations consistent with applicable 
law to address moral and religious-based objections to the preventive care mandate promulgated under 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4).”71  In response, the Agencies issued two new interim final regulations without 
issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking or soliciting public comment.72  The Agencies disregarded the 
core purpose of notice and comment, which is to give the public an opportunity to express their opinions 
before the regulations become finalized. When Agencies, such as HHS and the Departments of Labor and 
Treasury, promulgate interim final rules, there are set rules they must follow. However, the Agencies 
erroneously relied on both the statutory and good cause exceptions under the APA. Under the APA, if no 
exceptions qualify, Agencies must issue Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), and then issue a final 
 
67 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (The Bennett case identified two conditions that had to be satisfied for 
agency action to be final and subject to review under the Administrative Procedure Act: (1) The action must mark 
the consummation of the agency’s decision making process and (2) the action must be one by which rights and 
obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.))  
68 The Health Resources and Services Administration is a component of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services that focuses on improving health care to people who are geographically isolated, economically or medically 
vulnerable. Hrsa.gov. https://www.hrsa.gov/about/index.html. Congress directed the HRSA to issue guidelines 
setting forth the preventive health care services that women should be provided.  
69 Bennett v. Spear at 178 (1997) (note: the regulatory scheme issued by HRSA will be explored in section III.)  
70New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Saranac Power Partners, L.P., 267 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 2001).  
71 Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543, 558 (3d. Cir. 2019)  
72 Id.  
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rule accompanied by an explanation before the final rulemaking may go into effect.73 Here, the Moral IFC 
went into effect on Oct 6, 2017 and was never withdrawn in an attempt to preserve procedural rules.74 
C. Arguments Advanced in the Third Circuit  
 The Moral IFC is procedurally invalid because the Agencies under the Trump Administration did 
not follow notice-and-comment and do not qualify for any exceptions under the APA. The Third Circuit 
found that the Agencies failed to meet both exceptions to the APA notice-and-comment provision.  For 
the first exception, the court found no expressed statute that authorized the Agencies to defy the notice-
and-comment provision.75 The Health Insurance Portable and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) provision 
that the government relies on to justify deviation cannot possibly eliminate the requirement of notice-and-
comment because the APA only allows for a subsequent statute to modify or supersede procedural 
requirements to the extent the statute expressly says so.76  However, the Moral IFC provision does not 
contain express language exempting Agencies from the APA nor does it provide alternative procedures 
that could reasonably be understood as departing from the APA and thus authorizing the Agencies to 
disregard the notice and comment requirements.77  Thus, the notice-and-comment requirement was 
superseded by HIPAA.  
As to the second exception, the Third Circuit also found that the Agencies failed to demonstrate 
good cause for disregarding the notice-and-comment provision when it adopted the Moral IFC.78  The 
court explained that HHS had not shown that following the APA procedures would have been 
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to public interest.  The Third Circuit construed the good cause 
exception narrowly79  and in Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. EPA (“NRDC”), the Third Circuit 
recognized that “[c]ircumstances justifying reliance on the [good cause] exception is indeed rare and 
 
73 5 U.S.C. § 533 (b)-(d);  
74 Id. 
75 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 34. 
76 5 U.S.C. §559 
77 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 34. 
78 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 35.  
79 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 35; Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. EPA (“NRDC”) 683 F.2d 752, 764 (3d Cir. 1982).  
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will be accepted only after the court has closely examined proffered rationales justifying the elimination 
of public procedures.”80  All three arguments made by the government failed to meet the standard for 
good cause and were dismissed by the Third Circuit for being too broad and vague in details.81   
The government cited three reasons why it believed there was “good cause” to promulgate the 
rule without notice and comment (1) the urgent need to alleviate harm to those with religious objections 
to the previous regulations; (2) the need to address “continued uncertainty, inconsistency, and costs 
arising from litigation challenging the current rules;” and (3) the fact that the Agencies had already 
collected comments on prior mandate-related regulations.82  The court found that none of these claims 
were an adequate showing of good cause. First, the need to address harm to religious objections did not 
obliterate the need to follow required procedures.83  Because most regulations are directed toward 
reducing some harm, stating a mere attempt to mitigate harm to affected parties, without more specific 
facts, does not create the urgency necessary to establish good cause.84  Allowing an agency to invoke 
the good cause exception any time it sought to mitigate harm would abandon the narrow construction of 
the exception.85  In addition, the agency failed to cite any facts or impending deadlines sufficient to 
raise good cause.86  Second, the court found that the government’s need to address uncertainty was 
likewise insufficient to establish good cause because uncertainty follows every regulation. 
Consequently, the court reasoned, relying on the presence of uncertainty to forgo notice-and-comment 
requirements, “would have the effect of writing those requirements out of [the majority] of statutes.”87 
Third, the agency’s previous collection of comments regarding other rules about the Contraceptive 
Mandate cannot substitute for notice-and-comment.88  If comments were made after the passage of 
 
80 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 35. 
81 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 36.  
82 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 36. 
83 United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 509 (3d Cir. 2013).  
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 511.  
86 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 34.  
87 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 37; Chaffin, supra note 42 at 510.  
88 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 37-38.  
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Final Regulations, it would defeat the intended purpose to involve interested parties in the rule-making 
process because their participation would not make any difference.89  By the same token, the agency 
cannot avoid conducting comments prior to issuing Final Regulations.90  The court reasoned that if 
previous comments on similar matters met the standard, that would have the effect of eradicating not 
only the involvement of current interested parties, but the specific directions given by Congress to steer 
Agencies in the right direction of rulemaking.91  
 Lastly, the government contended that to the extent it violated the APA by forgoing notice and 
comment, it nonetheless, had remedied the violation by subsequently facilitating notice-and-comment. 
Under the Third Circuit precedent, post-promulgation of notice-and-comment procedures cannot cure 
the failure to provide such procedures before the final regulations are issued.92  The APA does not allow 
for notice-and-comment after the rule becomes final, therefore the Agencies cannot issue notice and 
comment after the Moral IFC has already been finalized and published.   In Sharon Steel Corp., the 
Third Circuit held “that the period for comments after promulgation cannot substitute for prior notice-
and-comment required by the APA.93  The Third Circuit reasoned that the notice-and-comment period 
initiated after the final regulations did not remain true to the core goals of the APA.94  In sum, the 
agency failed to show how the Moral IFC is unique and fits into the narrow framework of the good 
cause exception thus, they were bound to follow notice-and-comment.  
III. Substantive Invalidity of the Moral IFC  
 In addition to procedural defects, the Moral IFC is also substantively inconsistent with the 
Affordable Care Act and not authorized by the Religious Free Restoration Act.  The opponents of the 
Moral IFC, make textual and statutory arguments to the Third Circuit in support of invalidating the Moral 
 
89 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 37-38.  
90 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 37-38.  
91  Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 37-38.  
92 United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 509; Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. EPA (“NRDC”); Pennsylvania, supra note 
71 at 37-38.  
93 Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1979)  
94 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 38.  
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IFC, while the Government relies on the ACA and the RFRA as substantive guidelines for the enactment 
of the Moral IFC.95  The Third Circuit concluded that the Moral IFC is substantively invalid because 
neither the Affordable Care Act (ACA) nor the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) authorize or 
require the final rules.96  Thus, the court characterized the Moral IFC as arbitrary, capricious, and an 
abuse of discretion because it was issued in excess of the Agencies’ statutory jurisdiction and authority.97  
 According to the Third Circuit, the Moral IFC was incompatible with the ACA because it (1) 
conflicted with the explicit language of the ACA and (2) misconstrued congressional intent.  The Third 
Circuit found no textual support for the Agencies’ claim of authority under the ACA to create such an 
expansive exemption that allows employers to choose whether to provide contraceptive coverage.98  The 
ACA’s Women’s Health Amendment (WHA) allows Agencies to issue “comprehensive guidelines” 
concerning the type of services that are to be provided, but it does not give those Agencies the authority to 
undermine Congress’ directive concerning who must provide coverage for these services.99  Section 
300gg-13(a) of the Public Health and Welfare Statute, explicitly demands that group health plans and 
insurers “shall provide” the preventive care services set forth in the HRSA’s comprehensive guidelines.100  
Under this section, Congress issues a guide for the HRSA to follow when deciding what preventive 
services must be covered, while expressly limiting HRSA’s ability to determine who must provide these 
services.101 In other words, the statute allows the agency to identify services that must be covered but does 
not allow HRSA to exempt certain employers from providing these health services.  In addition, the 
absence of language that explicitly forbids Agencies from expanding exemptions, does not give them 
 
95 “The Government” represents the agencies which for purposes of this paper is comprised of the Department of 
Treasury, Employee Benefits Security Administration, Department of Labor, and Department of Health and Human 
Services.  
96 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 41.  
97 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 41.  
98 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 41.  
99 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 42-43; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (emphasis added).  
100 § 300gg-13(a) 
101 Id.; Plaintiff brief 2:17-cv-04540-WB, 2  
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power to do so. The fact that the ACA did not contain language specifically precluding Agencies from 
creating exemptions does not indicate that they have the authority to do so.102  
  Judge Shwartz acknowledged that the language of the Women’s Health Amendment is 
mandatory.103  The language provides that “group health plans and health insurance issuers shall, at a 
minimum, provide coverage for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements for preventive 
services for women identified by HRSA.”104  Thus, HHS’s regulation that increases the number of 
employers who can choose to opt out of birth control coverage is in direct conflict with the statute.  Most 
employers with a thinly veiled religious objection can now deny women free contraceptive coverage, and 
when that fails, employers can raise a moral objection, which can encompass a broad spectrum of moral 
rights and wrongs (a moral objection is too low of a threshold to meet as a justification to deny women 
basic birth control coverage). Further the Section 300gg-13(a) states that health insurers “shall” not 
impose cost-sharing.105  The Third Circuit points out that the use of the word shall is not subject to 
discretion, thus the term shall is mandatory and insurers are prohibited from forcing women to share in 
the costs of contraceptives covered under their health plan.106  Nothing in Section 300gg-13(a) gives 
HRSA the discretion to exempt employers of its choosing from providing the guided services.107  The 
Women’s Health Amendment does not authorize Agencies to adopt plans that would alleviate employers 
from providing preventive care services set forth in the HRSA-supported comprehensive guidelines.108  If 
employers can easily opt out of providing contraceptive methods, more women would be forced to share 
the costs of necessary services in order to have access to birth control and other forms of preventive care.  
This practice of cost-sharing is explicitly forbidden by the Women’s Health Amendment.109  
 
102 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 42. 
103 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 45.  
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 The Third Circuit also noted that previous actions taken by Congress also show that Congress—
and not the Trump Administration retains the authority to exempt certain employers from providing 
contraceptive coverage.110  Congress has demonstrated its power to exempt certain employers from 
various ACA requirements, including the Women’s Health Amendment,  by explicitly exempting 
grandfathered plans111, and employers with fewer than 50 employees.112  The Third Circuit reasoned that 
by exempting specific actors from the ACA’s mandatory requirements, Congress reserved for itself (not 
the Agencies) the exclusive role of making exemptions.113  Further evidence that Congress intended to be 
the sole governing body to exempt employers comes from 2012, when Congress considered and rejected a 
statutory conscience amendment that would have operated similarly to the challenged exemptions in the 
Moral IFC.114  The decisions to reject similar exemptions and adopt certain ones, is evidence that 
Congress not only intended to have the responsibility of exempting employers, but also to set an example 
of behavior  for agencies to follow.  By adopting the Moral IFC that intended to do what Congress 
refused, the Agencies took actions that directly conflicted with Congress’ intent and further exacerbated 
the power struggle between the two branches of government. 
 As a supplemental argument, the legislative intent was clear that family planning was always 
intended to be a part of the ACA’s Contraceptive Mandate, as several senators discussed the obligation to 
provide important services for women.115  Thus, when addressing women’s health, Congress added the 
 
110 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 45.  
111
42 U.S.C § 18011; (The “grandfathered plans” refers to the portion of the Affordable Care Act that “permits 
some health plans. Those offered before the ACA passed, to be exempt from some of the law’s rules and 
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Barr, Kaiser Health News. November 13, 2013. https://khn.org/news/grandfathered-plans-faq/ 
112 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2); 42 U.S.C. §§ 18011(a), (e); 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2) 
113 Pennsylvania, supra note 71 at 45.  
114 158 Cong. Rec. S1162, 1173-74 (2012); Pennsylvania, 930 F.3d at [43.];  
115 155 Cong. Rec. S12,271 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 2009); see, e.g., 155 Cong. Rec. S12 see. e.g., 155 Cong. Rec. S12, 
271 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 2009) (statement of Sen. Franken) (“under [the WHA], the Health Resources and Services 
Administration will be able to include other important services at no cost, such as. . .family planning.”); id. at 12,274 
(statement of Sen. Murray) (“we have to make sure we cover preventive services, and the WHA takes into account 
the unique needs of women. . .women will have improved access to. . .family planning services.”); 155 Cong. Rec. 
S12, 025 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2009) (statement of Sen. Boxer) (“these health care services include. . .family planning 
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WHA to the statute (ACA) as a directive to the HHS to develop a list of services to be covered and as 
noted by some senators, “contraception was always intended to be on it.”116  The Moral IFC threatens 
women’s ability to get contraceptive coverage through their insurance; a service for women that was 
discussed and advocated by several senators when enacting the WHA.  The Moral IFC under the Trump 
Administration also deviates from the purpose of the ACA, to close the gap between the amount of health 
coverage men pay compared to the excessive costs women pay for health care.117  The ACA addresses 
longstanding gender disparities in health care services, and the Contraceptive Coverage Mandate was 
intended to effectuate that goal.118  Senator Kirsten Gillibrand noted, “Not only do women pay more for 
the coverage we seek for the same age and the same coverage as men do, but in general women of 
childbearing age spend 68 percent more in out-of-pocket health care costs than men.”119  Senator 
Gillibrand also highlighted that the current health care system puts women at an economic disadvantage 
because of the cost not only associated with child bearing, but maintaining reproductive health at older 
ages.120 In sum, the Moral IFC conflicts with text of the Affordable Care Act, which designates Congress 
as the institution charged with determining the extent of employers exemptions’ under the Contraception 
Mandate. The Moral IFC also does not abide by the legislative spirit and intent of Congress, thus the 
Third Circuit correctly found that the Moral IFC was substantively invalid because it conflicts with the 
ACA.  
 In addition, to the Moral IFC’s incompatibility with the ACA, the Third Circuit also found that 
the Moral IFC could not be salvaged by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  The RFRA 
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provides that the federal government “shall not substantively burden a person’s exercise of religion even 
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.121  The court held that the Government’s effort to 
construe RFRA as providing appropriate authority for religious exemptions was erroneous because (1) the 
RFRA does not authorize the enactment of additional religious exemptions to address religious burdens 
and (2) the accommodation addresses burdens imposed on third parties who face consequences for 
complying with contraceptive mandates.122  
 The Third Circuit found several reasons why the RFRA does not empower agencies to allow 
religious objectors to decline to provide contraceptive coverage without notifying their insurance issuer or 
employees.123  One, the court recognized that RFRA’s protections apply only to religious objectors, who 
oppose the accommodation process,  not third parties.124  In respect to the accommodation process, the 
actual provision of the contraceptive coverage is by a third party, so the court reasoned that “any possible 
burden from the notification procedure [was] not substantial.”125  Two, the court found that the RFRA 
does not permit the granting of broad exemptions such as the one established by the Moral IFC nor retain 
the right to not provide notice of an employer’s decision not to provide coverage.126 As the Third Circuit 
explained in Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs “the self-certification form 
does not trigger or facilitate the provision of contraceptive coverage because coverage is mandated to be 
provided by federal law.”127  Federal law, rather than any involvement by the employers in filling out or 
submitting the self-certification form, creates the obligation of the insurance issuers and third-party 
administrators to provide coverage for contraceptive services.128  Third, the court noted that “Agencies 
downplayed this burden on women, contradicting Congress’s mandate that women be provided 
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contraceptive coverage.129  Further, the court pointed out that the Agencies downplayed the significant 
burden the new religious exemptions would impose on female employees who would lose coverage.130  
Under the ACA, the religious exemptions and accommodation should not hinder woman’s ability to get 
health coverage.  As Hobby Lobby held “no prior decision under the RFRA allows a religious-based 
exemption if the accommodation would be harmful to women, the very persons the contraceptive 
coverage requirement was designed to protect.131  Judge Shwartz emphasized that “the Agencies even 
recognized the record shows that thousands of women may lose contraceptive coverage if the [Moral IFC] 
is enforced and frustrate their right to obtain contraceptive.”132  
 In sum, the Third Circuit held that the Contraceptive Mandate, did not infringe on the religious 
exercise of covered employers because RFRA only applies to employers not third parties, and federal law 
dictates the obligation of insurance issuers and third parties to provide coverage, not the Agencies.   
IV. Bigger-Picture Problems 
 The Third Circuit has found that the Moral IFC is procedurally and substantively invalid. 
Procedurally, the Moral IFC is deficient because the HHS failed to follow notice-and-comment and did 
not qualify under any exceptions. Substantively, the rule conflicts with the spirit and purpose of the ACA 
and the RFRA does not authorize the promulgation of such an expansive religious and moral exemption 
of protected contraception.  The Moral IFC does not just invoke procedural and substantive challenges, 
but also calls into question core constitutional principles.  First, the Trump Administration’s record 
reveals that the Moral IFC is only a piece of a larger trend of administrative malfeasance. This trend of 
imprudence shows not only that the Trump Administration continuously fails to follow various procedural 
rules in a range of administrative fields, but also implicates larger separation of powers concerns.  
Second, the passage of the Moral IFC is problematic because the denial of women contraception signifies 
privacy rights associated with bodily autonomy and dignity.  
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A. The Trump Administration's Pattern of Unilateral Executive Action and the Impact on  
 Separation of Powers 
 The blatant disregard for administrative-law protections is not a new phenomenon under the 
Trump Administration. The pattern of unilateral executive action during the Trump Administration proves 
that the promulgation of the Moral IFC without proper notice-and-comment is no outlier. This portion of 
the comment explores the trend of cases reflecting the Trump Administration’s non-compliance with 
administrative procedures which ultimately implicates larger separation of power concerns. The sheer 
numbers and magnitude of cases showing non-compliance and disregard for core procedural and 
substantive requirements of the APA and other restrictions on executive-branch power is especially 
concerning.  
 In a range of administrative fields including healthcare, environmental, and consumer protection, 
the Trump Administration has frequently failed to adhere to the procedures set forth by the APA and 
courts have struck down many of the Trump Administration’s actions on procedural grounds. For 
instance, in Philbrick v. Azar, a district court in D.C. struck down HHS’s effort to roll back the Medicaid 
expansion of the Affordable Care Act as arbitrary and capricious for failing to address the loss of 
coverage that would occur under the decision.133  The Second Circuit also found agencies to be non-
compliant with the APA in  Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, holding that the Environmental 
Protection Agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously by applying a lesser standard and failing to examine 
key assumptions when promulgating a rule to regulate discharge of ballast water from ships.134  In another 
case involving the EPA, Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste v. Pruitt, a federal district court in 
California found that the EPA’s persistent delays of a rule designed to reduce harmful pesticides were 
illegal because the agency failed to comply with notice-and-comment requirements.135  In Am. Acad. of 
 
133Philbrick v. Azar, 397 F. Supp.3d 11 (D.D.C Cir. 2019); Institute for Policy Integrity New York University 
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Pediatrics v. FDA, a Maryland federal district court found that the Food and Drug Administration 
illegally failed to follow notice-and comment requirements and intentionally delayed a rule which would 
have required e-cigarette manufactures to obtain pre-approval before marketing their products.136  The 
Department of Education also failed to comply with the APA, in Bauer v. DeVos, in which a D.C. district 
court held that the Department of Education’s third delay of the Borrower Defense Rule was illegal 
because the Agency failed to comply with the negotiated rulemaking requirements of the Higher 
Education Act.137  In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Interior, the Department of Interior was put 
under pressure by the court to include bumble bees in the endangered species listing after being sued for 
failing to follow notice-and-comment procedures in its delay of protections for bumble bees.138  
 Most district courts have struck down the Trump Administration’s attempt to undermine various 
regulatory initiatives of the Obama Administration. Generally, courts have rejected Agencies’ attempts to 
unilaterally pass regulations without the appropriate procedures for a few reasons. One, courts have 
emphasized the importance of the opportunity for public comment because the “new rules” issued by 
Agencies typically conflict directly with strong, well-documented public opinion.139  Thus, the courts 
recognize that facilitation of public comment to counter agency action is a core part of legitimizing 
administrative fairness. Two, Agencies under the Trump Administration have rarely shown why they 
could not achieve the same goals by going through notice-and-comment procedures.140  Three, courts 
have universally rejected various attempts by Agencies to argue that they were planning to undertake 
notice-and-comment in the future.141  If courts allowed notice-and-comment to take place in the future 
after the rule is already in effect, then comments from interested parties after the fact would be futile. 
Further, such a poor argument would defeat the purpose of the APA to promote civic engagement, 
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accountability, and fairness. The remedy in most courts has been to strike down regulations promulgated 
without notice-and-comment and to require Agencies to comport with the APA’s procedures before 
imposing binding rules on regulated parties. 142  Considering the Moral IFC is one part of this trend 
reflecting the Trump Administration’s disregard for administrative procedures and acknowledging the 
sweeping impact the employer expansion will have on women’s health care, we all should be especially 
troubled by the separation-of-powers implications invoked by Trump Administration’s actions.   
 The Moral IFC, like other regulations denied by courts across the country, is constitutionally 
impermissible because it is a product of unilateral executive action which operates to weaken 
constitutional separation of powers.  The Trump Administration’s unilateral executive actions reveal a 
stark departure from the Framers’ vision of separated powers.  The Framers intentionally established a 
structure of government that divided power in such a way so that no one branch would have too much 
power or authority over the others, with each branch beholden to specific constitutional duties.143  The 
Trump Administration’s blatant attempt to ignore procedural rules, set out by the branch of government 
that entrusted them with this power, strays further from the Framers’ intent to create a government in 
which each branch maintains its constitutionally designated roles and monitors each other.144    
 Congress relies immensely on Agencies “to promulgate rules and standards that have binding 
force of law.”145  Congress acknowledges that it may not have the time nor expertise to adequately 
complete the laws, but it recognizes that administrative Agencies have the specialized knowledge and 
experience to effectively carry out the legislative mandate.146  Thus, Agencies are sometimes more 
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equipped than the legislative branch to identify and address the details that could inhibit effective rules 
and regulations.147  
 By not following the procedural rules mandated in Section 553 in the APA, the Trump 
Administration abuses the responsibility bestowed on it by the Legislative Branch; exercising a 
prerogative that the Constitution does not countenance.  Under the ACA’s contraceptive mandate, 
Congress has not left Agencies with “genuine ambiguous relations,” and thus, deference to HHS’s is not 
warranted.148  Congress provides very specific and limiting instructions for HHS in providing regulations 
related to women’s health care coverage.  Thus, the regulations (Moral IFC) were enacted in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, and limitation, and the Agencies’ approach to repeal contraceptive 
coverage treads perilously close to usurping Congress’ constitutional duty to make laws.  
 The Women’s Health Amendment to the ACA further affirms the existence of a firm legislative 
check on the Agencies’ ability to prescribe rules of their choosing.149  Congress adopted Section 553 as a 
mechanism to retain some semblance of control over the administrative Agencies.150  Because Congress 
delegated substantial power to administrative Agencies, it is indispensable in the interests of justice and 
fairness for Congress to be granted authority to restrain the Executive Branch from completely taking 
over its role as law maker.  Thus, procedures of Section 553 are a method for Congress to legitimize 
agency legislation151 and acts as a check on Executive power as a way to uphold democratic principles.152   
 The continuous trend of cases demonstrating the refusal of the Trump Administration to follow 
congressionally mandated limits further jeopardizes the essential goal of the Framers: to prevent one 
branch from becoming too powerful. Unilateral action by the executive may not be too uncommon but 
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considering the laundry list of cases in the Trump Administration’s record, we should be especially 
concerned of this discord between executive power and administrative procedures.  
B. The Encroachments on Health-Care-Related Rights (and the Rights of Women in Particular) 
 At a general level, the Constitution affords us the freedom to explore different lifestyles. One 
such freedom that has been influential in shaping the lives of women is the freedom to use birth control.  
Birth control is a basic health care service that benefits women of all ages, races, and socioeconomic 
statuses.153  Women’s use of contraceptives has been solidified in groundbreaking Supreme Court cases 
such as Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird.154  In Griswold, the Court reasoned that 
governmental regulation cannot sweep so broadly as to invade areas of protected freedoms such as 
marriage and procreation.155 Eisenstadt took the idea of protected freedoms a step further and extended 
the right to privacy of reproductive rights to all individuals, thus preserving the right to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into personal decisions to bear children.156  Though not necessarily 
an outright violation of these principles, the Moral IFC certainly undercuts their force, by significantly 
restricting women’s ability to obtain birth control.  If more employers are able to opt out of providing 
birth control coverage under their health insurance plans, then a large number of women could be left 
with no contraceptive coverage at all.  Essentially, the Moral IFC presents two serious problems: (1) the 
regulations undermine the vitality of the right to privacy established by the Court’s substantive due 
process jurisprudence, and (2) the regulations unfairly cut against women’s desire to maintain steady, 
unobstructed access to birth control.  
 The development of the right to privacy began with Griswold v. Connecticut. In Griswold, the 
Court considered a Connecticut law that made it illegal for anyone to use or assist in the use of 
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contraception.157 The Supreme Court found the law invalid because it operated to control intimate 
relations between married couples, which the court found was a fundamental right in the “penumbra” of 
the Bill of Right.158 The Court recognized privacy as a fundamental right in preventing intrusions into the 
spatial boundaries of the home and wanted to protect the ability to control information about 
contraceptive use.159  After Griswold,  there seemed to be uncertainty whether the right to privacy was 
rooted in preventing intrusions in the home, protecting martial relationships, or safeguarding personal 
autonomy.  However, the Court would later clarify that ‘privacy’ for women’s access to birth control 
extends beyond the narrow reading of ‘right to privacy’ in Griswold.160 Although Griswold is important 
because it exemplifies the court’s rudimentary discussion of the fundamental right to marriage and 
procreation, Griswold and its progeny articulates a negative right, that only applies to governmental 
prohibitions and restrictions on contraceptive services.161 After Griswold, the court followed a trend of 
expanding the scope of privacy in different contexts.  For example, Eisenstadt expanded the protected 
decisions among married couples to private choices made by individuals concerning procreation.162   
Although the case was not decided on a substantive due process framework, Justice Brennan’s opinion in 
Eisenstadt explained that the right to privacy can be “unmistakably understood” as an expansion of the 
narrow reading of privacy under Griswold.163  The Court’s expansion of the right to privacy in the context 
of marriage to privacy rights of individuals was critical in laying the groundwork for Roe v. Wade.164  
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 Roe reaffirmed by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,  established a right to 
bodily autonomy as a fundamental right protected under the Due Process Clause.165  Both cases restrict 
governmental interference with a woman’s access to abortion.166  Roe established that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision to terminate 
her pregnancy.167  Roe helped conceptualize the evolution of privacy from physical privacy of the home 
and marriage168 to include decisional autonomy.169   
 The Supreme Court does not per se recognize a positive “right to birth control” nor does it 
guarantee the “right for health care plans to cover contraceptives.”  However, these cases emphasize the 
willingness of the Court to acknowledge a right of privacy and the recognition of the important role that 
contraceptives play in securing bodily freedom and autonomy. A right to bodily autonomy and dignity are 
constitutional touchstones that are in jeopardy when a large class of employers are given the “green light” 
to eliminate contraceptive coverage from their health plans.  Employers should not be allowed to take 
away a key health service for women and essentially control important personal decisions that should 
only be made by women such as procreation, bodily regulation, and choice of lifestyle.  The protection of 
a woman’s right to access contraceptives are twofold; in general, the use of birth control has been 
approved by courts in Griswold and Eisenstadt170 and a woman’s right to make personal decisions about 
procreation and bodily well-being has been encompassed under the expansive right to privacy in Roe and 
Casey.171  Thus, because contraception is intertwined in the right of privacy, courts should review with 
close scrutiny any executive-branch action that undermines statutory guarantees that the court has helped 
to effectuate. Thus, the Moral IFC should be reviewed carefully because contraceptive coverage invokes 
rights of women’s health and privacy.  The restriction of access to birth control is an encroachment on 
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women’s health care.  Such encroachment seriously threatens the constitutional right to freedom of choice 
and bodily autonomy.  
 To be clear, these cases do not represent the linchpin to defeating or suppressing the passage of 
the Moral IFC. This argument would be very difficult to make. The Constitution prohibits states from 
criminalizing the use of birth control, but it does not explicitly require the federal government through 
intermediary or private employers to fully subsidize the use of birth control. In fact, the contraception 
jurisprudence shows that courts have disfavored compelling the government to subsidize abortion and 
family health-planning services. In Maher v. Roe, the court upheld a state regulation granting Medicaid 
benefits for childbirth but not for medically unnecessary abortions because the statute placed no obstacle 
in a pregnant women’s path. 172  Similarly, in Rust v. Sullivan, the court affirmed that Congress’ refusal to 
fund abortion counseling and advocacy leaves a pregnant woman with the same choices as if the 
government had chosen not to fund family-planning services.173  Thus, while Roe v. Wade only protected 
a woman’s choice to terminate pregnancy, the state is still allowed to withhold financial support for 
abortion and other family planning services.  Although the Supreme Court has not directly recognized the 
government’s decision not to publicly fund contraception, the Court’s inclination to uphold a similar right 
in the abortion context, may reveal its’ tendency to affirm federal or state refusal to fund birth control.  
 Even so, however, the Supreme Court’s recognition of individual rights and personal bodily 
autonomy should encourage courts to review with special care administrative actions that render it more 
difficult for individuals to exercise those rights.  Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman recast the strict 
traditional notion of privacy as referring only to the physical wellbeing, to the progressive conception to 
include “moral soundness of its people.”174  Justice Harlan viewed the right of privacy in broader terms to 
include a right of individuals to make important decisions about marriage, family, children, and 
procreation.175  Harlan’s broad construction helps conceptualize the court’s recognition of women’s 
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freedom to make personal decisions176, while Roe takes the individualized liberty established by Harlan in 
Griswold a step further to include the right to make choices concerning the body and procreation.177  The 
Moral IFC chips away at this almost 55-year-old Supreme Court precedent of individualized decision-
making.  According to Planned Parenthood, 57 percent of women would not be able to afford 
contraception unless subsidized through insurance.178 Thus, if the option for contraceptive coverage is 
taken away by employers, women and families are not truly given the option to control whether they want 
to expand their families.  This critical and deeply intimate decision is left to employers and ultimately 
refutes the idea of providing “moral soundness” for women. 
 The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the nation has been 
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive rights.179  Roe emphasized that the government 
“cannot force upon women physical and psychological burdens and make then incubators against their 
will.”180  Although most employers will retain the right to deny contraceptive coverage in their health 
coverage plans, women will still have the right to use birth control. However, birth control may be harder 
to obtain if women have to pay for them out of pocket and employers are given the power to influence 
women’s bodily decisions.  
 Although, the government has no obligation to subsidize abortion or contraception, these cases 
show that the court disfavored governmental action that threaten to disrupt women’s personal lives by 
making it difficult to obtain an abortion.181  Women’s reliance on contraceptive coverage invokes a 
serious issue for the HHS’s Moral IFC.  Restricting a health service guaranteed to women under the ACA 
and the WHA can possibly be seen as a similar denial of the fundamental right to bodily autonomy as a 
state’s hinderance to a women’s ability to get an abortion.  Both federal action under the HHS and state 
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anti-abortion laws, create roadblocks for women to ensure their bodily health and a rightful exercise of 
their personal autonomy.  The courts should keep in mind that women have structured their lives around 
access to contraception in the same fashion that women have arranged their lives around the ability to 
obtain an abortion.  Taking away contraceptives would upset the way that millions of women have 
organized their lives. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent in Casey, emphasized the government’s 
evidence establishing the importance of contraception to a range of woman’s health needs and concluded 
that contraceptive coverage under the ACA further compels the public health and interests of women.182   
V. Putting it all together/conclusion 
 In conclusion, the Moral IFC is procedurally invalid due to the failure of the Agencies to follow 
notice-and-comment without invoking any exceptions. It is also substantively invalid because the ability 
to expand the number of employers exempt from providing contraceptive coverage conflicts with the 
narrow religious exception outlined in the ACA and is not authorized under the RFRA. These defects in 
and of themselves provide ample grounds for invalidating the Moral IFC in its entirety. But they are made 
all the more glaring in light of the Moral IFC’s troubling relationship to the Trump Administration’s 
general disregard for separation-of-powers principles and to an important and enduring set of privacy-
related constitutional guarantees.  
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